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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Respondent's Brief in Opposition does not begin with the issue on which
certiorari was granted, "whether Deseret Diversified Development had the
authority as a beneficial owner to impose binding covenants, conditions, and
restrictions." But, Petitioner's Reply Brief will begin with that issue.
The Beneficiary's Authority Issue.
On the beneficiary's authority issue, Petitioner argued in its Opening Brief
that although a trust beneficiary has authority over its beneficial interest in the
trust, the trustee has exclusive authority over the assets it holds in trust.
Therefore, since the land in question was an asset held by the trustee in trust,
Deseret Diversified had no authority to impose binding CC&R's.
In its Respondent's Brief, Respondent claims that the Utah legislature
changed the established rule by including a person holding a power of
appointment in the statutory definition of trust beneficiary1 and that this Court
changed the established rule by a 1949 decision, Cronquist v. Utah State Agr.
College?
In this Reply Brief, Petitioner shows that neither the statutory definition nor
1

Utah Code Ann. sec. 15-1-103 (1) (b) (2005 Supp.).

2

114 Utah 426,201 P.2d 280 (1949).
4

this Court's 1949 decision changed the established rule.
The Agency Issue.
In its Opening Brief, Petitioner argued that Security Title did not "ratify"
the Rerecorded CC&R's by signing the plat because (1) Deseret Diversified was
not Security Title's agent, (2) Deseret did not purport to act for Security Title, (3)
the Utah Statute of Frauds requires any agency with respect to real property to be
in writing, and (4) the plat and the Rerecorded CC&R's are inconsistent.
In its Brief in Opposition, Respondent does not counter those four points,
but argues that Deseret Development's status as "developer" gave it authority to
impose binding CC&R's. This argument is based on agency law, not trust law.
In this Reply Brief, Petitioner begins by discussing the "fool's errand"
problem posed when the higher court grants certiorari on only one of two grounds
relied on by the lower court. Petitioner arguesfromUnited States Supreme Court
precedent that if this Court decides for Petitioner on the beneficiary's authority
issue, it should not affirm the Court of Appeals on the agency grounds, but either
review the agency issue itself or remand to the Court of Appeals to reconsider the
agency issue in the light of the truth that W. Brent Jensen was not Security Title's
president.
Petitioner then replies to the argument Respondent makes in its Brief in
5

Opposition that Deseret Diversified's status as developer gave it authority to
impose CC&R's. Petitioner points out that under the Utah Statute of Frauds,
Deseret Diversified's status as developer did not give it agency authority with
respect to real property.
The Statutory Presumption Issue.
Respondent argues in its Respondent's Brief that the statutory presumption
that statements of fact in a recorded document are true3 applies to Deseret
Diversified's statement in the Rerecorded CC&R's that it owns the property in
question. Therefore, without regard to trust law or agency law, Deseret
Diversified as the presumed owner had the right to impose the CC&R's unless
Petitioner can prove it wasn't the true owner.
Petitioner replies that the statutory presumption does not apply to
declarations of ownership. Ownership is not a "fact" within the meaning of the
statute, but a conclusion of law to be determined from the chain of title.
The Scandalous and Unjust Conduct Issue.
Respondent accuses Counsel for Petitioner of making a scandalous and
unjust personal attack on the Court of Appeals. Petitioner replies that Counsel for
Petitioner made no personal attack. Counsel only criticized what the Court of
3

Utah Code Ann. sec. 57 - 4a - 4 (1) (j) (2000).
6

Appeals tonJi'il il lil ' *II llu li'\i'l >\\ 11 ico I uc v Uie distinction is expressed as
"hate the sin "*ut love the sinner." On the level of the law, the distinction allows a
lawyer to challenge what a lower court did in the strongest terms without fear that
it will be taken as a personal attack.
ARGUMENTS
1

This Court has always distinguished a trust beneficiary's beneficial

interest in a trust from the assets neia ay me irusit

(•'•;:'

•• -h ssots held y me trustee m u ust.

Petiti' .> • • >1ained that "

'aw regards a trust beneficiary's property rights as an

interest in the trust itself, analogous to shares of stock in a corporation, not as
pi i >perty rights in the assets held by the trustee in trust, analogous lu «•
'. < 11 poration's own assets. Pelif ioner explained that while a beneficiary has
authority to dispose of its beneficial interest in the trust (by analogy, to sell the
shares), a beneliciary has no aiillioiil'y Iniliipiii nl Ihe .issels held hv llie Inr.ln
in h n s i 1 t h y -IIMIOJ'V

h> si II llli 1 m l p i n . I I I O H ' S . I S S I I S ) .

In its RiieI'i11 (>pp<isition, Resp tucm oegins by ignoring the distinction.
Respondent quotes the Restatement rule that "the beneficiary of a trust has the
4

Petitioner's Opening Brief, pr

1n

7

1 ft

power to transfer his interest,"5 and then applies this rule to the assets held by the
trustee in trust, as though they were the same thing.6
On the irrelevance of the Uniform Probate Code.
Respondent then argues that the Utah legislature "implicitly acknowledged"
that beneficiaries have power of disposition over the assets held in trust by
including in the statutory definition of "beneficiary" a person who holds a power
of appointment.7 Frankly, Petitioner does not understand Respondent's argument
on this point, but Petitioner will reply by explaining why the inclusion of a person
holding a power of appointment in the statutory definition of "beneficiary" has
nothing to do with the issue of a beneficiary's authority over the assets held in
trust.
A power of appointment creates a problem for a trust. Until the power is
exercised, the ultimate beneficiary will remain unknown. For example, suppose
Grantor deeds Blackacre to T in trust, income to L for life, and then the trust to
terminate and T to convey Blackacre to such person as P shall appoint by deed or
5

Respondent's Brief, p. 23, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS,
sec. 132(1959).
6

"The general right of the beneficiary to alienate its interest in the trust res
is reaffirmed by the Utah Uniform Trust Code." Respondent's Brief p. 23.
7

Respondent's Brief, p. 24.
8

will, or, if P makes no appointment, to Q. In this example, P holds a classic
"general power of appointment."
L is the life beneficiary, but who is the remainder beneficiary? If T
threatens to cut down all the trees on Blackacre, who can bring an action to
prevent the waste? L wont. Cutting down the trees will generate more income for
L. But, until P exercises the power of appointment (or dies without having
exercised it), the ultimate remainder beneficiary will remain unknown.
The Utah Uniform Probate Code solves this problem by including P in the
statutory definition of "beneficiary."8 P can bring an action to prevent the waste
even though the ultimate remainder beneficiary remains unknown. The statutory
definition does not reverse the established rule that a trust beneficiary has no
power of disposition over the assets held by the trustee in trust. It solves the
problem of the unknown beneficiary.
On the irrelevance of Cronquist v. Utah State Agr. College.
Respondent then argues that this Court ruled that a beneficiary has authority
to convey assets held by the trustee in trust in 1949 by its decision in Cronquist v.

8

"'Beneficiary' means a person that:. . . (ii) in a capacity other than that
of a trustee, holds a power of appointment over trust property." Utah Code. Ann.
sec. 75 - 7 -103 (1) (b) (2005 Supp.).
9

Utah State Agr. College.9 Respondent says of that case: "wherein the Court
permitted the beneficiary to convey, by quitclaim deed, his interest in the College
Farm."10
The facts in Cronquist were simple. Olif Cronquist died in 1927 and left the
College Farm in trust, income to his three children for twenty years and, at the end
of the twenty years, the trust to terminate and the trustee to convey the farm to the
three children in equal shares. In 1944, when the trust still had three more years to
go, Heber Cronquist, one of Olif s three children, entered into an executory
contract to sell his one-third share of the College Farm to Utah State Agricultural
College when he received itfromthe trustee and also executed and delivered to
Utah State a quitclaim deed to the farm. The quitclaim deed was delivered to Utah
State before the trust terminated. After the trust terminated in 1947, Heber
brought an action to have the contract and the quitclaim deed declared invalid on
the grounds that the trust had been a spendthrift trust and, therefore, he had no
power to alienate his interest in the trust in 1944. Utah State counterclaimed for
specific performance of the executory contract. The lower court held for Utah
State and Heber appealed.
9

114 Utah 426,201 P.2d 280 (1949).

10

Respondent's Brief pp. 18-29.
10

In its decision in Cronquist, this Court said that "there is only one
substantial question involved, and that is whether the testamentary trust created by
the will of Olif Cronquist was what is known as a spendthrift trust."11 The holding
of this Court was that to create a valid spendthrift trust "[t]he intention to establish
a spendthrift trust ought clearly to appear in the instrument creating the trust.
There should be specific language declaring the trust or language from which such
an interest might reasonably be inferred. A mere trusteeship is not enough to
make a spendthrift trust."12 Applying that holding to Olif Cronquist's
testamentary trust, this Court held it was not a spendthrift trust.
The holding of Cronquist has nothing to do with the issue of what interest,
if any, Heber transferred by the quitclaim deed.13 Still, the fact is that Heber
executed and deliver a quitclaim deed before the trust terminated. So, the question
is "what interest, in any, did Heber transfer by the quitclaim deed?"

11

201P.2dat282.

12

201 P. 2d at 285, internal citations and quotations omitted.

13

An interesting question is whether Heber would have had grounds to
invalidate the quitclaim deed if the trust had been a spendthrift trust. His
quitclaim deed only conveyed whatever rights he had. So, if he had no rights at all
(assuming that would be the consequence if the trust had been a spendthrift trust)
he would have conveyed nothing by the quitclaim deed. But that is no reason to
invalidate a quitclaim deed.
11

It certainly was not Heber's rights as trust beneficiary in the College Farm.
If Utah State had been relying on the quitclaim deed as conveying those rights, it
would not have insisted that he perform the executory contract. It wanted a new
deed from Heber after he received the land from the trustee. It did not rely on the
quitclaim deed to convey the fee.
The most likely answer is that Utah State was concerned that Heber had
rights in the land not as a trust beneficiary but as Olif s "heir." If Olif s will were
held to be invalid, Heber would take a share of the farm as one of Olif s heirs.
Utah State must have wanted to be sure that if Olif s will were invalid it would
still get Heber's share of the farm, so it had Heber execute and deliver the
quitclaim deed to convey whatever rights Heber might have as Olif s heir. These
did not include the rights he had as trust beneficiary. Nor did Heber convey his
beneficial interest in the trust. If he had, when the trust terminated, the trustee
would have deeded Heber's share of the farm directly to Utah State. Utah State
had Heber enter into an executory contract to convey his one third interest in the
farm when the trust ended and the land was distributed to him.14
14

This Court did not address the issue of whether, assuming the trust had
been a spendthrift trust, Heber could nevertheless enter into a valid executory
contract to sell his share of the College Farm in the future when he received it
from the trust. Was his entering into the executory contract "alienating his interest
in the trust?" Most trust lawyers today would say it was not.
12

So, Cronquist is not a case where this Court "permitted the beneficiary to
convey, by quitclaim deed, his interest in the College Farm," as Respondent
claims. It is a case where this Court permitted an heir to convey, by quitclaim
deed, his rights as heir. This Court has never strayed from the classic rule that
"the trustee has exclusive control over the trust property, subject only to the
limitations imposed by law or the trust instrument."15
2. If this Court decides for the Petitioner on the beneficiary's authority
issue, it should not turn this appeal into a fool's errand by affirming on the
agency grounds, but either take up the agency issue itself or remand to the
Court of Appeals for reconsideration.
The first point is that this Court did not grant certiorari on the agency issue,
so why does Respondent feel free to discuss it?
The problem of a grant of certiorari on one issue when the lower court has
decided the case on two grounds is the "fool's errand." If this Court decides for
Petitioner on the issue on which certiorari was granted (the beneficiary's authority
issue), is it obliged to affirm the Court of Appeals on the alternative grounds on
which certiorari was not granted (the agency grounds)? If it is, this Court sent
Petitioner on a fool's errand when it granted certiorari.
15

In Re Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17, para. 12,71 P.3d 589,594.
13

The solution for the fool's errand problem is shown by the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.16 In that case a plane
manufactured by Piper Aircraft in America crashed in Scotland. The pilot and the
passengers were all Scotts. A Scottish company operated and serviced the plane.
The pilot had been trained in Scotland and at the time of the crash the plane was
subject to Scottish air control. The Scottish air safety authorities investigated the
crash.
The passengers' next of kins brought an action in California. They frankly
acknowledged that their purpose in bringing the action in the United States was to
take advantage of its more favorable products liability law. The action was
removed to federal court and transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
Piper then moved for dismissal on the grounds offorum non conveniens,
stipulating that it would personally appear and defend an action in Scotland.
The trial court granted Piper's motion, but the Third Circuit reversed on two
grounds. It held that dismissal is never appropriate when the law of the alternative
forum is less favorable to the plaintiff. It also held that under the Gilbert
balancing test, Pennsylvania was the more appropriate forum in any case.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the "law less
16

454 U.S. 235 (1981).
14

fii\ nrable to plaintiff issiir huf no! on Hit "Gilbertbalancing test" grounds. It
then reversed the Third Circuit on both issues, holding that the action should be
dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
In the majority opinion, the issue of whether the Court was going beyond
the grant of certiorari is discussed in a footnote. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote
that the second grounds was implicitly within the grant of certiorari, but
"even if the issues we discuss in Part III [i.e.,the application of the Gilbert
balancing test] are not within the bounds of the questions with respect to
which certiorari was granted, our consideration of these issues is not
inappropriate. An order limiting the grant of certiorari does not operate as a
jurisdictional bar. We may consider questions outside the scope of the
limited order when resolution of those questions is necessary for the proper
disposition of the case."17
Justice Marshall wrote for a majority of six justices. Three dissented. The
dissenters thought the proper disposition was to remand the case to the Third
Circuit for reconsideration of the Gilbert balancing test. None of the justices
thought the decision of the Third Circuit should be affirmed on the alternative
ground, turning the granting certiorari
Applying I lit* i tilt- ol /'//;< v Aircraft to the facts of this case, this Court
should either take up the agency issue itself (perhaps asking for additional briefs)
or remand to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in the light of the truth that
17

454 U.S. at 247 n. 12.
15

W. Brent Jensen was not the president of Security Title.
3. Status as "developer" does not confer agency authority to impose
CC&R's on land.
Respondent argues that Deseret Diversified's status as developer is apparent
from the Rerecorded CC&R's and the plat, and that this status gave it authority to
impose CC&R's. Petitioner replies that a "developer" can have any one of a
number of legal relationships with the land owner. The developer can be an
independent contractor who has only agreed to do a job and is not subject to
control by the owner. It can be an agent who has agreed to act for the owner's
benefit and to be subject to the owner's control.18 It can be an employee who has
also agreed to be subject to the owner's control with respect to the manner in
which the job is done.19 "Developer" itself is not a status to which the law gives
any agency authority at all.
When it comes to real property, status does not create agency authority. The
employees the local Home Depot all have "employee" status, but that does not
give them authority to impose CC&R's on Home Depot's land. When it comes to

18
19

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

sec. 1 (1958).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY sec

16

2 (1958).

real property, llu I 'l.ih Maluk of I'nudv'0 pre idt lli;il anlhonh i an i>i'k ' r

111 1111 M , IM' i here is a written document signed by the owner of record,
Security Title, the Plat for Forest Meadow Ranch Plat "D." The plat does not say
that Deseret Diversified was Security Title's "agent." It does not rarity the
Rerecorded CC&R's. It does not even refer to them. It does not even cover the
same geographic area. The Court of Appeals wrongly says that W. Brent Jensen
signed the plat for both Security Title and for Deseret Diversified. If he had
signed for both company's that would have been some evidence that the two

lelalionship does not ireale agency authority.
The phrase "as a matter of law" is critical when the issues in this case are
matters of the interpretation of recorded documents. The premise of the Utah
recording system is that rights in real property are to be decided from the recorded
documents, reading those documents in accordance with rules of law so that every
lawyer and every judge will give them the same meaning.
IIK

meaning ol lh< "Ownri \ I >0(1HM1 ion'' is Ihe \ame on every plat. Itdoes

nol establish who owns 11
. K: land, but only that, if and to the extent the signors have
20

Utah Code Ann. set

(1998).
17

some interest in the land, they dedicate to the public whatever part of the land
shown as public property.
Statements on a plat can also put people on "inquiry notice." Again, this is
a matter of law. Every lawyer and judge who reads the plat will be put on inquiry
notice as to the same things.
Two statements on the Forest Meadow Ranch Plat "D" put people on
inquiry notice. The "subdivider's note" puts people on inquiry notice that Deseret
Diversified may own the streets. The note says "all streets shown hereon shall
remain the property of the subdivider, 'Deseret Diversified Development.'" [R0027, Addendum document "3" in Petitioner's Opening Brief]. Then there is the
word "trustee" following the name of Security Title. These statements do not
prove Deseret Development owned the streets or that it was the beneficiary of the
trust. They put people on inquiry notice that Deseret might have some ownership
interest and that there might be a trust.
Being put on inquiry notice means that if there is an unrecorded deed by
which Security Title transferred the streets to Deseret Diversified, or an
unrecorded declaration of trust making Deseret Diversified the trust beneficiary,
that unrecorded document will be valid and binding. Inquiry notice does not
create property rights. It keeps property rights created by other documents from
18

being invalidated by failure to record. In this case, of course, those other
documents have never been produced.
lie statutoi i jo i

ttion that statem*

>f fact in recorded

documents are true does not apply to claims of ownership because the statute
regards ownership as a conclusion of law, not as a "fact."
Respondent argues beginning at the bottom of page "14" and continuing on
to the end of page "19" of its Brief that the statutory presumption that "recitals and
other statements of fact in a [recorded] document . . . are true,"21 applies to
the statement made by Deseret Diversified in the Rerecorded CC&R's that is the
"owner" of the south half of Section 22. This argument is purely statutory
not grounded in trust law or agency law.
IVIilionti K'plics thai o'\ ni'i'ihiii is not ,i " h r f w it hi n the meaning ofthe
umption. The basic principle ofthe Utah Statute of Frauds and the
Utah Recording Act is that ownership is to be determined from the chain of title,
not from self-serving declarations. Therefore, "ownership" is not a "fact" within
the meaning ofthe statutory presumption. "Ownership" is a conclusion of law to
be reached from an examination ofthe documents in the chain of title.

Utah Code Ann. sec. 57 - 4a - 4(l)(j) (2000).
19

If the statutory presumption applies to a self-serving declaration of
ownership, transferring property by recorded deeds is so much vanity. If
declarations trump the chain of title, people should record declarations of
ownership of whatever property they'd like to own and not bother with deeds.
The "facts" covered by the statutory presumption are facts like those stated
in the statute - mergers and name changes of organizations.
4. Counsel for Petitioner did not make a personal attack on the Utah
Court of Appeals. He criticized the Court of Appeals for what it did.
The Bible tells of many prophets who criticized the Jewish people for what
they did - starting with Moses' criticism of the people with respect to their making
a golden calf22 and ending with John the Baptist's call for the Jewish people to
repent.23 But the prophets' criticism was for what the people did, not for who they
were. The prophets loved and respected the Jewish people. It was this love that
drove them to speak out. The prophets hated the sin but loved the sinners.
Some people did not appreciate the distinction. John the Baptist was
beheaded.24
22

EXODUS 32 (King James).

23

MATTHEW3:1-11

24

MATTHEW

(King James).

14: 1 - 12 (King James).
20

Like the prophets of old, counsel ku lYlitioiut low s I In.' I.iw. I h> hn\
provides the common j..»i( ii 11 ii I \\\\nr ivnplc ol iliflnt'iil
backgrou

I,KVS.

religions, and ethnic

ommon good. This, counsel for Petitioner

In lu'vts, is Amrnni's defining characteristic. Our respect for the law transcends
our differences of race, religion, and ethnic background and turns those
differences into a source of strength that nations whose identities are based on a
common race, religion, or ethnicity cannot understand. So, like the prophets of
old, Counsel for Petitioner criticized the Court of Appeals and Judge Greenwood
for what they did. He did not make a personal attack.
So Petitiont
question "whai
!<:.>.'

simple
i

• '• •' «ireenwood do?"
: ; Counsel for Petitioner of making "scandalous and

unjust" criticism in broad terms, but two specific matters stand out, (1) the factual
question of whether W. Brent Jensen was the president of Security Title, (2) the
legal question of whether paragraph "17" of Capital Assets Financial Services v.
Maxwell25 holds that a trust beneficiary can encumber real property held by
trustee in trust.
Was W, lis ml .linst'ii llii president of Security Title?
25

2000 UT 9,994 P.2d 201.
21

In her opinion Judge Greenwood wrote as follows:
"Respondent urges that the interests that later became Deseret were the
same as the beneficiaries of the trust naming Security as trustee, and that
those beneficiaries were sufficiently definite. Indeed, the facts appear to
support this conclusion that Deseret was the beneficial owner despite the
lack of comprehensive documentation. Jensen signed on behalf of both
Security and Deseret: listed himself as president of Security and
incorporator of Deseret: and utilized the term "trustee" only for Security.
Moreover, Deseret signed the 1971 CC&R's as beneficial owner and
developer. Such evidence is consistent with a scheme in which Deseret
would oversee the development of the property granted in the Bates Deed.
As such, we conclude the word "trustee" on the 1971 CC&R's, together
with extrinsic evidence, reflect the existence of a trust, with Deseret as
beneficiary." [2005UT App 264 at para. 30, emphasis added].
What is wrong with that passage? Please take the time to read it again and
then consider the following questions:
(1) Who are "the interests that later became Deseret?" Is that phrase
sufficiently precise to identify a specific person? Is there anything in the real
estate records that shows who that person was? How does a person "become" a
corporation? Petitioner submits that the passage does not identify the trust
beneficiary in 1965, the date of the Bates Deed, and that the rule of law is that
there can be no trust without an identifiable trust beneficiary.26

26

Utah Code Ann. sec. 75 - 7 - 402 (1) ( c) (Supp. 2004), cited by the Court
of Appeals at 2005 UT App 294, para. 30; Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181,
183 (1981)(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS see's. 2 and 17 (1959);
th
GEORGE T. BOGART, TRUSTS sec. 11 (6 ed. 1987).
22

(2) Where is "the trust naming Security as trustee
Frauds expressly requites ,i vMilh.ii Ini' I Mm uniriii in i H nc i HUM with irspect Id
i ciil properly Where is iT Whether the trust was written or oral, what were the
lei ms of the trust? The rule of law is that there can be no trust unless the terms of
trust are known.27
(3) The truth is that W. Brent Jensen did not sign anything on behalf of
Security Title, but precisely what document is Judge Greenwood writing about
when she wrote the underlined sentence? Assuming Judge Greenwood is writing
about the Plat for Forest Meadow Ranch i
nn W

Addendum docuii i
:••

'Vis
•

please
.,

dPetiti*

t
^ -'

espectfully suggests that the Court

rhe record itself on such an important point.

Please note that "Leo D. Jensen" signed for Security Title as its "vice
president." Please note that the notarial acknowledgment identifies "Leo D.
Jensen & L.R. Wright" as the vice president and secretary of Security Title Co.
(4) Next, the Court may want to look over Respondent
filed with the C

Appellee"

' Appeals in I h is case on (>< Inlui • Jl,

27

Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181,184 (1981) (citing RESTATEMENT
th
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS sec. 2 and 4 (1959); GEORGE T. BOGART, TRUSTS sec. 11 (6
ed. 1987).
23

Respondent never claimed that W. Brent Jensen had signed any document on
behalf of Security Title. What this means is that the false claim that W. Brent
Jensen signed the plat on behalf of Security Title originated with Judge
Greenwood.
Courts of law sit in judgment on other professions. Suppose a doctor
operated on "Leo D. Jensen" when the true patient was "W. Brent Jensen." The
doctor might become the defendant in a court of law. Doctors are expert in
medicine. What are judges expert in? Does what the Judge Greenwood did in this
case meet this Court's professional standards?
Finally, please note the critical importance in Judge Greenwood's opinion
of her false claim that W. Brent Jensen was the president of Security Title. It is
the only evidence that Judge Greenwood cites to support her holding that "the
interests that later became Deseret" were the trust beneficiary in 1965. She also
cites the Rerecorded CC&R's, but they date from 1971, so they are irrelevant to
the situation in 1965.
What did this Court hold in Capital Assets Financial Management?
In Petitioner's Opening Brief, it points out that in paragraph "17" of its
decision in Capital Assets Financial Management v. Maxwell this Court held that
no trust is created when property is transferred by quitclaim deed for the purpose
24

of the transferee using it as collateral for a loan. Counsel J 01 IVIitionei llim
argued that it is logically impossiI ik in ITI Iron) MM! Imlilm^ in ,i holdim' thill trust
beneficiaries I i<»u',u II i mill', in CIKIIIIIIK I llu* jissrMielil by ;I trustee in trust.
.1'lease reread Respondent's explanation of Capital Assets in footnote "8" on
page " 19" of the its Respondent's Brief. Respondent's quotations from the
opinion deal with the question of whether a judgment lien attaches to assets held
by a judgment debtor who is also a trustee. They have nothing to do with the
authority of a trust beneficiary to encumber the assets held by the trustee in trust.
Finally, please reread Justice Stewart's opinion in Capital Ass en
convenience, a xerox copy is attached In ll'is hiH .is Addentlimi ilnnimrnl ' 7 "
Please make n|i w

\\\\

ml w hrtlin i irasmmiMc person could draw

In mi (he language <>l p;ii;i(.',rapli "I /" the holding that trust beneficiaries have the
power

ncumber the assets held by their trustees in trust.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, Petitioner respectfully asks this Court to hold

that trust beneficiaries do not have authority to impose binding CC&R's on land
held by trustees in trust, and then take up the agency issue, e11h<• i <KT II11111• it ,11111
reversing the Com
reconsiilemt

Appeals, wi iviiiandirij', to Ifn < ntiil nl Appeals f«>r

MI iij.'Jit n' 'hr truth th-

•'
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Jensen did not sign the plat for

Security Title.
Respectfully submitted, this 6th day of March, 2006.

/s/ Boyd Kimball Dyer
Counsel for Petitioner/Appelkint
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the following date I served two copies of the foregoing
Reply Brief by depositing the same in the U.S. Postal Service, first class postage
prepaid, addressed to the following person:
Mr. Edwin C. Barnes, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 - 2216
Dated: March 6,2006
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/

/s/ Boyd Kimball Dyer
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2000 UT 9

CAPITAL ASSETS FINANCIAL
SERVICES, Plaintiff and
Petitioner,
v.
Garlon J. MAXWELL, Dean R. Lindsay,
Val B. Johnson and Janae Peterson
a.k.a. Janae Lott, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 980222.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 14, 2000.
Holder of trust deed brought action to
establish priority of its claim over real property, as against judgment lienholder. The
District Court, Provo Department, Howard
H. Maetani, J., granted trust deed holder's
motion for summary judgment, and judgment lienholder appealed. The Court of Appeals, 956 P.2d 1090, reversed and remanded.
Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court,
Stewart, J., held that grantor's quitclaim
deed of property to grantee so that grantee
could pledge the property as collateral for a
loan secured by a trust deed created a "real
property" interest in grantee upon which a
judgment lien attached.
Judgment of Court of Appeals affirmed.
1. Certiorari <S=>64(1)
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals for
correctness.
2. Judgment <£=>752
A judgment lien has no greater dignity
in property law than the nature of the property interest to which it attaches.
3. Mortgages <&=>138
A trust deed is intended to convey some
kind of title to real property.
4. Mortgages <S^138
Of necessity, a trust deed conveys more
than "bare legal title" to land because the
point of the deed is to allow the sale of the

property upon default to satisfy the underlying obligation. U.C.A.1953, 57-1-23.
5. Judgment <s^780(2)
A judgment hen attaches to a debtor's
beneficial and equitable property interests,
even if the debtor has no record title.
UCA1953, 78-22-1.
6. Judgment <®=>801
Once a judgment lien attaches, a judgment creditor may levy execution on the
property or foreclose on the lien if called
upon to defend against an action to cancel
the lien interest.
7. Judgment e=>780(5)
A judgment lien will not attach to a
debtor's "bare legal title" in property because such a debtor holds no equitable or
beneficial interest in the land. U.C.A.1953,
78-22-1.
8. Judgment <®=>780(3)
A judgment lien will not attach to a
vendor's interest in a land sale contract.
U.C.A.1953, 78-22-1.
9. Judgment <s=>780(5)
No judgment lien will attach to an
agent's or trustee's interest in property.
U.C.A.1953, 78-22-1.
10. Principal and Agent ^127.1,129
An agent may hold title to property
after purchasing it, or before selling it, on
behalf of the actual owner.
11. Trusts <®=>134
Trustees hold title in the res of a trust in
their names, but do so on behalf of the trust
beneficiaries, not themselves.
12. Judgment <S=>780(1)
Grantor's quitclaim deed of property to
grantee so that grantee could pledge the
property as collateral for a loan secured by a
trust deed transferred a beneficial interest in
the property to grantee, though grantee
deeded the property back to grantor after
obtaining the loan, and thus, grantee's interest constituted "real property" upon which a
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judgment lien attached. U.C.A.1953, 57—1— real estate available as security. In January
1(3), 78-22-1.
1995, Peterson's daughter, Janae Peterson
See publication Words and Phrases
Lott, gave Christensen a quitclaim deed for
for other judicial constructions and defreal property she owned in fee in Utah Couninitions.
ty. There is no dispute that on the date she
executed the quitclaim deed, she was the fee
13. Judgment <£=>780(1)
Equitable considerations did not make it title holder. According to uncontested affiunfair to hold that judgment lien attached to davits from Lott, Peterson, and Christensen,
quitclaim deed grantee's interest in property Christensen was to use the property to obdeeded by grantor so that grantee could tain a loan from Capital Assets and then
pledge the property as collateral for a loan reconvey the property to Lott. Christensen
secured by a trust deed, where grantor and and Lott never intended that Christensen
trust deed beneficiary, with a modicum of would fully own the property.
care, could have accomplished their objective
114 Subsequently, Christensen delivered
of creating a mortgage lien with priority over a trust deed for the property dated January
the judgment lien.
17, 1995, to Capital Assets. Under the trust
deed, Capital Assets was the named beneficiary and the trustee had the power to sell
ON CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH
the property for the benefit of Capital Assets
COURT OF APPEALS
if Christensen defaulted on the loan. See
Bruce A. Maak, Salt Lake City, for plain- Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23 (1994). Lott's
tiff.
quitclaim deed to Christensen and ChristenKent B. Linebaugh, Stephen R. Sloan, Salt sen's trust deed in favor of Capital Assets
Lake City, for defendants.
were both recorded January 18, 1995. On
April 25, 1995, Christensen reconveyed the
STEWART, Justice:
property to Lott by warranty deed. Lindsay
111 This case, which we originally trans- sought to execute on his judgment lien by
ferred over to the Utah Court of Appeals, is sheriffs sale on December 13,1995.
here on certiorari from a decision by that
115 Capita] Assets sued Lindsay, Lott,
court, Capital Assets Financial Services v. and two other judgment lienholders to settle
Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090 (Utah Ct.App.1998). the order of Hen priority on the property.1
The Court of Appeals reversed the district Capital Assets moved for summary judgment
court's grant of summary judgment in favor based on affidavits from Lott, Peterson, and
of Capital Assets Financial Services ("Capital Christensen, which stated that, despite Lott's
Assets"). We affirm.
absolute quitclaim deed of the property to
112 The facts of the case are undisputed. Christensen, Lott and Christensen only inIn May 1994, Dean R. Lindsay obtained a tended that Christensen use the property as
default judgment against R. Craig Christen- collateral.
sen in Utah County. Under Utah Code Ann.
116 The district court granted summary
§ 78-22-1(2), that judgment became "a lien judgment to Capital Assets for two reasons.
upon [Christensen's] real property . . . First, the court ruled that the affidavits were
owned or acquired during the existence of admissible to show the intent of the parties
the judgment, located in the county in which as to the quitclaim deed. Second, based on
the judgment is entered." Utah Code Ann. the affidavits and Christensen's reconveyance
§ 78-22-1(2) (1996).
of the property to Lott, the court ruled that
the
sole purpose of the quitclaim deed was to
113 In late 1994, Christensen sought a
loan from Capital Assets. Capital Assets provide Christensen collateral for the purrequired collateral to secure the loan, and pose of obtaining a loan. After obtaining the
Christensen asked a friend, Larry Peterson, loan, Christensen was obligated to return his
whether he or a family member could make interest in the property to Lott. In short, the
1. Lindsay and Capital Assets are the only parties

before this Court.
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court held that Christensen had only a temporary, limited interest in the property and
that a judgment lien could not attach thereto.
117 The Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's summary judgment and held
that Christensen's interest was subject to the
judgment lien. The court stated:
In giving Christensen a quitclaim deed
to her property, Lott intended to transfer
enough ownership to Christensen to allow
him to obtain financing by offering the
property as security for a loan. Lott intended that Christensen have the authority
to transfer to Capital Assets the power to
sell the land for an unpaid debt. This
degree of ownership is sufficient for a
judgment debtor to acquire the power to
possess by levy, or sell by foreclosure, the
real property to satisfy the unpaid judgment
Under the circumstances so described, the judgment liens are prior and
superior to the interest conveyed by the
trust deed.
Capital Assets, 956 P.2d at 1096.

law than the nature of the property interest
to which it attaches." Butler v. Wilkinson,
740 P.2d 1244, 1257 (Utah 1987). There is no
dispute that Christensen held an interest in
the property during the time Lindsay had a
judgment lien against whatever real property
interests Christensen had in the county.
Lott's quitclaim, on its face, conveyed all her
rights, title, and interest in the property to
Christensen with the intent, according to extrinsic evidence, that he have an interest
sufficient to convey a trust deed to Capital
Assets. On the face of it, that interest is
"real property" under section 78-22-1, the
judgment lien statute. Therefore, Christensen had an interest in the property at least
"to the degree necessary to convey a trust
deed interest to Capital Assets."2 See Capital Assets, 956 P.2d at 1094. That is what
Lott intended in quitclaiming to Christensen.
Ull A trust deed is
a deed ... conveying real property to a
trustee in trust to secure the performance
of an obligation of the trustor or other
person named in the deed to a beneficiary.
[1] 118 We issued a writ of certiorari to
A trust deed is similar to a mortgage in
review that ruling. On certiorari, we review
that it is given as security for the perforthe decision of the Court of Appeals for
mance of an obligation. However, a trust
correctness. See Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v.
deed is a conveyance by which title to the
Wall, 978 P.2d 460, 461 (Utah 1999).
trust property passes to the trustee.
119 In this Court, Capital Assets argues
Upon default, the trustee has power to sell
that the Court of Appeals' decision is wrong
the property to satisfy the trustor's debt to
because (1) a judgment lien attaches only to
the beneficiary.
a judgment debtor's beneficial interest in First Sec. Bank v. Banberry Crossing, 780
property, (2) Christensen did not possess a P.2d 1253, 1256 (Utah 1989) (emphasis addbeneficial interest because he held the prop- ed) (internal quotation marks and footnotes
erty for the limited purpose of securing his omitted); see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1loan and therefore had only a bare legal title, 19 to -36 (1994).
and (3) the decision is unfair.
[3,4] 1112 Thus, a trust deed is intend[2] 1fl0 It is axiomatic that "a judg- ed to convey some kind of title to real propment lien has no greater dignity in property erty.3 Of necessity, it conveys more than
2. The Court of Appeals agreed with the district
court that the affidavits, to the degree they alleged facts, not law, were properly admissible to
show that Lott and Christensen intended that
Christensen would have ownership in the property only to the extent needed to obtain a loan, i.e.,
convey a trust deed interest to Capital Assets.
See Capital Assets, 956 P.2d at 1094. Neither
party has asked the Court to review this holding;
therefore, the Court of Appeals' decision on that
point stands.

3. The trust deed that Christensen conveyed to
Capital Assets is consistent with the notion that a
trust deed conveys title to property. That deed
indicates:
Borrower [Christensen] irrevocably grants and
conveys to Trustee, in trust, with power of sale,
the following described Property located in
UTAH County, U t a h . . . .
BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is
lawfully seized of the estate hereby conveyed and
has the right to grant and convey the Property
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"bare legal title" to land because the point of
the deed is to allow the sale of the property
upon default to satisfy the underlying obligation. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23
(1994). Christensen's trust deed is conceded
to be valid. Indeed, Christensen and Capitol
Assets admitted Christensen's beneficial interest in the property when they executed
the trust deed. The trust deed states:
Borrower [Christensen] irrevocably grants
and conveys to Trustee, in trust, with power of sale, the following described Property. ...
BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is lawfully seized of the estate hereby conveyed and has the right to grant
and convey the Property . . . .
Capital Assets would not have accepted the
trust deed as security if it had not agreed
that Christensen held the property interest
asserted therein. It follows that the trustor
in this case necessarily possessed sufficient
fee interest in the property to sell it under
certain circumstances. Otherwise, he could
not have conveyed that right to the beneficiary.
U13 In short, Lott quitclaimed her interest in the property to Christensen to enable
him to create a trust deed. Therefore, as a
matter of law and logic, Christensen held a
fee interest in the property sufficient to allow
him to sell it.
and that the Property is unencumbered, except
for encumbrances of record. Borrower warrants and will defend generally the title to the
Property against all claims and demands, subject to any encumbrances of record.
. . . Reconveyance. Upon payment of all
sums secured by this Security Instrument,
Lender shall request Trustee to reconvey the
Property and shall surrender this Security Instrument and all notes evidencing debt secured
by this Security Instrument to Trustee. Trustee
shall reconvey the Property without warranty
and without charge to the person or persons
legally entitled to it. Such person or persons
shall pay any recordation costs.
4. Capital Assets argues that it is possible to possess title sufficient to create an encumbrance on
property and still not possess an interest to
which a judgment lien can attach. It analogizes

I. REQUIRED INTEREST FOR
JUDGMENT LIEN TO
ATTACH
1114 The judgment lien statute states,
"the entry of judgment by a district court is
a lien upon the real property of the judgment
debtor, not exempt from execution, owned or
acquired during the existence of the judgment, located in the county in which the
judgment is entered." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-22-1(2) (1996). The real estate title of
the Code defines "real property" as "any
right, title, estate, or interest in land." Id.
§ 57-1-1(3).
[5-11] 1115 For purposes of section 7822-1, a judgment lien attaches to a debtor's
beneficial and equitable property interests,
see, e.g.t Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244
(Utah 1987), even if the debtor has no record
title. See Utah Coop. Ass}n v. White Distrib.
& Supply Co., 120 Utah 603, 237 P.2d 262
(1951) rev'd on other grounds, 2 Utah 2d 391,
275 P.2d 687 (1954). Once a judgment lien
attaches, a judgment creditor may levy execution on the property or foreclose on the
lien if called upon to defend against an action
to cancel the lien interest. See Free v. Farnworth, 112 Utah 410, 188 P.2d 731 (1948).
However, a judgment lien will not attach to a
debtor's "bare legal title" in property because such a debtor holds no equitable or
beneficial interest in the land. See, e.g., Belnap v. Blain, 575 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978). For
example, a judgment lien will not attach to a
vendor's interest in a land sale contract.4
this case to Cannefax v. Clement, 818 P.2d 546
(Utah 1991), in which the Court held that a
judgment lien could not attach to a vendor's
interest in a land sale contract. See id. at 549.
The holding in Cannefax hinged on the concept
of equitable conversion, which "transfer m[s] a
vendor's interest in a land sale contract from a
real property interest into a personal property
interest" as the vendee pays the installments on
the contract. See id. at 548. The Court stated
that "the vendor's true interest is in receiving the
unpaid amount on the contract, an interest more
akin to personalty than to realty." Id. at 549.
Equitable conversion, however, does not apply in
this situation, in which Christensen conveyed a
trust deed to Capital Assets. Christensen's interest in the property was not personalty; it was
real property, as a trust deed is a "[t]ransfer[ ] in
trust of real property." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1—
20. Since that interest was realty, not personalty, a judgment lien could attach to it.
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See Cannefax v Clement, 818 P 2d 546, 54950 (Utah 1991) (stating that the vendor holds
title for the benefit of the vendee and that,
based on equitable conversion, vendor's real
interest is in personalty, not realty) Nor
will a judgment hen attach to an agent's or
trustee's interest m property5 See Barlow
Soc'y v Commercial Sec Bank, 723 P 2d 398,
401 (Utah 1986)(statmg that one holds bare
legal title if one is "the trustee of an express,
constructive, or resulting trust, or an agent,
or mere conduit for the transfer [of property]
to the true owner") None of these examples
applies m fact or by analogy to Christensen
He was not a vendor m a land sale contract,
nor was he a trustee or an agent under the
facts of this case6
1116 Nevertheless, Capital Assets asserts
that Chnstensen's interest amounted to
"bare legal title," to which a judgment hen
could not attach They rely on dictum found
m Belnap v Blain, 575 P 2d 696 (Utah 1978),
to support their argument In Belnap, a
plurality quoted the following language from
Freeman on Judgments but stated that it
was inapplicable to the case
"[W]henever one holds the naked legal title, having no beneficial interest, there is
nothing to which the judgment hen can
attach, and a sale under execution to a
purchaser with notice is inoperative, and
does not even convey the legal title
Hence when a grantee is a mere conduit,
as where he purchases property m his
name as the agent of another, with the
latter's funds, and subsequently conveys to
5

An agent may hold title to property after pur
chasing it or before selling it on behalf of the
actual owner See, e g Zenda Mining & Milling
Co v Tiffin, 11 CalApp 62, 104 P 10 (1909)
Wheeler v Nelson, 130 Minn 365, 153 NW 861
(1915), Cresswellv McCaig, 11 Neb 222 9 N W
52 (1881) Also, trustees hold title in the res of a
trust in their names, but do so on behalf of the
trust beneficiaries, not themselves See e g Riv
erdale Mining Co v Wicks, 14 CalApp 526, 112
P 896(1910), Fitch v Double V" Sales Corp
212 Md 324, 129 A 2d 93 (1957), Brown v
Hodgman, 124 W Va 136, 19 S E 2d 910 (1942)
In each of these instances, the agent or trustee
appears to be the owner of the property because
title is in the agent's or trustee s name, however,
the actual owner is someone else, for whom the
agent or trustee holds the property See, eg,
Riverdale Mining 14 CalApp at 535-36, 112 P
896 If the agent or trustee were to misuse or

him, there is no interest to which a judgment hen can attach The same result
arises when title is placed in the name of a
person so that he may sell it and pay the
proceeds to the owner, or solely to enable
him to procure a loan thereon, and after
procuring the loan, he reconveys to his
grantor
"
Id at 699 (emphasis added) (quoting 2 Freeman on Judgments § 956, at 2010-11 (5th
ed 1925)) Capital Assets relies heavily on
this language, citing the emphasized portion
as dispositive m this case
[12] 1117 We have never adopted as
Utah law the specific Belnap dictum at issue
here 7 We dechne to do so now There is a
significant difference between the type of
bare legal title possessed by an agent or
trustee and the beneficial interest that Christensen undisputably possessed here
Agents and trustees have no direct beneficial
interest m the property to which they hold
title Their title is held purely for the benefit of another In the instant case, Christensen received from Lott more than bare legal
title The quitclaim deed was consistent with
passing a fee interest and the intent of the
parties was to allow Christensen to use the
property as security for his own benefit To
hold that Chnstensen's interest was a nonbeneficial, "bare legal title" would be inconsistent with chain of title and the intent of
the parties
II. EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS
[13] 1118 Finally, Capital Assets argues
it is manifestly unfair to Lott and Capital
misappropriate the property the actual owner
could sue for damages
6

The Court of Appeals correctly stated
Nei
ther Lott nor Christensen intended that Christensen act as trustee or agent
for Lott Capital
Assets, 956 P 2d at 1094 A review of the record
confirms that the property was not the res of an
express, constructive, or resulting trust in which
Christensen was trustee Nor was Christensen
Lott's agent, since neither Lott s quitclaim deed
to Christensen or those parties' affidavits indicate that he had actual or apparent authority to
act on Lott s behalf

7

In Barlow we acknowledged that the same
proposition advanced by plaintiffs in that case
was supported by dictum in Belnap, but we did
not base our decision m Barlow on the dictum
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Assets to hold that a judgment lien may
attach to Christensen's property interest. It
is no doubt true that the result in this case
does not comport with the expectations of
Lott and Capital Assets. However, with conveyances of real property, we necessarily
deal with the recording act and the policies
underlying it which are intended to impede
fraud, to foster the alienability of real property, and to provide for predictability and
integrity in real estate transactions. To that
end, the intention of the parties to a transaction may be overridden by rules that promote a basic policy that, in the long run, will
effectuate the intentions of most parties in
most transactions. As we have stated before, "Under U.C.A., 1953, 78-22-1, a judgment automatically becomes a lien upon all
nonexempt real property of the judgment
debtor at the time it is docketed. [The] ...
right to a judgment lien is unconditional and
is not subject to alteration by a court on
equitable grounds." Taylor Nat'l, Inc. v.
Jensen Bros. Constr. Co., 641 P.2d 150, 155
(Utah 1982). With a modicum of care, the
parties could easily have accomplished their
objective without any complications. For
this Court to extricate them from the difficulties they have created would required us to
ignore the plain meaning of the judgment
lien statute.
IT 19 Affirmed.
1 20 Chief Justice HOWE, Justice
ZIMMERMAN, Justice RUSSON, and
Judge HILDER concur in Justice
STEWARTS opinion.
U 21 Having disqualified herself,
Associate Chief Justice DURHAM does not
participate herein; District Judge ROBERT
K. HILDER sat.

